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Abstract
Cognitive fusion (CF), involves the tendency to “buy in” to thoughts and feelings and consists of 
three empirically established domains: somatic concerns, emotion regulation, and negative 
evaluation. CF is hypothesized to play a role in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). The 
present study examined how well the CF domains, relative to traditional cognitive-behavioral 
constructs (i.e., obsessive beliefs such as inflated responsibility), predict OCD symptoms. 52 
treatment-seeking adults with OCD completed self-report measures of CF, obsessive beliefs, 
OCD symptoms, and general distress. Domains of CF were differentially associated with the 
responsibility for harm, symmetry and unacceptable thoughts OCD dimensions, yet after 
accounting for obsessive beliefs, only the negative evaluation domain of CF significantly 
predicted symmetry OCD symptoms. Obsessive beliefs significantly predicted all OCD 
dimensions except for contamination. These findings provide additional support for existing 
cognitive-behavioral models of OCD across symptom dimensions, with the exception of 
contamination symptoms, and suggest that the believability of thoughts and feelings about 
negative evaluation adds to the explanation of symmetry symptoms. Conceptual and treatment 
implications, study limitations, and future directions are discussed.
Keywords: obsessive-compulsive disorder, cognitive fusion, obsessive beliefs, symptom 
dimensions, cognitive model 
Key Practitioner Message: 
 Domains of cognitive fusion and obsessive beliefs differentially predicted OCD severity 
across empirically-derived symptom dimensions
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 Findings indicate that the efficacy of therapeutic techniques derived from cognitive-
behavioral (CBT) and acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) may differ across 
symptom dimensions, given observed differences in mechanisms across OCD subtypes 
 Future research is warranted to extend these findings and identify for whom ACT-based 
augmentation approaches are optimally indicated 
1.
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Introduction
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), which affects 1-3% of the adult population, is 
characterized by intrusive thoughts that evoke anxiety and distress (i.e., obsessions) and overt or 
covert behaviors (e.g., compulsions, avoidance) that are performed to control intrusions and 
reduce associated distress (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Kessler et al., 2005). The 
course of OCD is chronic, and without treatment it tends to worsen over time resulting in 
significant impairment across various domains of functioning (Steketee, 1997). Moreover, OCD 
presents with considerable heterogeneity; the content of obsessions and compulsive behaviors 
vary between as well as within individuals over time (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992). When the 
prevalence, course, and functional impairment associated with OCD are considered along with 
the diverse symptom picture, one recognizes the necessity of developing a fine-grained 
understanding of the presentation and persistence of this complex and multifaceted condition. 
A number of conceptual models have been proposed to account for the factors at work in 
OCD. Presently, the cognitive (or cognitive-behavioral) approach has the most empirical support 
(Rachman, 1998b, 1998a; Salkovskis, 1999). This model posits that obsessions begin as 
normally occurring intrusive thoughts that are reported by virtually everyone in the general 
population (Rachman & de Silva, 1978). Whereas most people appraise such intrusions (e.g., the 
thought of deliberately harming a loved one) as senseless and inconsequential, those with OCD 
catastrophically misinterpret such thoughts as personally significant or otherwise highly 
threatening (e.g., “This thought means I could ‘snap’ and harm someone, so I must take extra 
precautions to assure that does not happen”). This leads to an elevated sense of fear, 
preoccupation with the thought, and efforts to reduce the perceived threat and resulting distress 
using compulsive rituals and avoidance. Although rituals and avoidance may be temporarily 
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successful in reducing distress, such behaviors prevent the individual from learning that their 
obsessional fears are unfounded, leading to a self-perpetuating vicious cycle (Rachman, 2002; 
Salkovskis, 1999). Misinterpretations of intrusive thoughts are thought to arise from a set of 
dysfunctional beliefs (obsessive beliefs; (Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 
2005)) including the tendency to overestimate threat and personal responsibility, inflate the 
importance of and need to control intrusive thoughts, and exaggerate the need for perfectionism 
and certainty.
Structural analyses provide empirical support for conceptualizing obsessions and 
compulsions as cohering along four themes: (a) contamination obsessions with cleaning rituals, 
(b) obsessions about responsibility for harm with checking rituals, (c) “not just right” or 
symmetry obsessions with ordering and arranging rituals, and (d) obsessional thoughts pertaining 
to sex, religion, and violence with mental and neutralizing rituals (e.g., thought suppression) 
(Mataix-Cols, do Rosario-Campos, & Leckman, 2005; McKay et al., 2004; Sookman, 
Abramowitz, Calamari, Wilhelm, & McKay, 2005). These symptom dimensions have been 
useful for informing more granular conceptual models which highlight the specific pathways 
through which the various OCD symptom dimensions are maintained. For example, 
contamination fears are primarily associated with overestimates of the likelihood and severity of 
threats related to germs and disease (Rachman, 2004), although disgust proneness and inflated 
responsibility for harm have also been robustly associated with contamination-related fears (e.g., 
Olatunji, Armstrong, & Elwood, 2017). Concerns around symmetry present when individuals 
hold rigid beliefs about the need for control, perfection, and completeness, and perceive “not just 
right” experiences to be highly intolerable (Summerfeldt, 2004). Fears regarding harm or 
catastrophic mistakes are thought to emerge from inflated beliefs about personal responsibility 
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for causing or preventing harm (Salkovskis et al., 1996). Lastly, obsessions about sex, religion, 
or violence result from the belief that thoughts are equivalent to actions, and the strongly held 
sense that one should be able to control their thoughts (Rachman, 1998a; Shafran, Thordarson, & 
Rachman, 1996). 
These “mini-models” have considerably advanced our understanding of the processes that 
confer risk for and maintain OCD (e.g., (Abramowitz, Khandker, Nelson, Deacon, & Rygwall, 
2006)). Further, they have been key to developing and fine-tuning effective cognitive-behavioral 
interventions for different presentations of the disorder (e.g., (Abramowitz, 2006; McKay et al., 
2015)). However, they fail to fully account for symptoms in statistical analyses. Wheaton et al. 
(2010), for example, found that obsessive beliefs along with general distress only explained from 
11% (contamination) to 42% (responsibility for harm) of the variance in OCD symptom severity 
across symptom dimensions. Thus, it is necessary to identify additional constructs that may 
augment the explanatory power of existing evidence-based models and subsequently yield 
notable treatment implications. 
Relational frame theory (RFT; (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006)) was 
developed to explain the bidirectional relationship between cognition and language, and to 
enhance the understanding of psychological phenomena. According to RFT, human behavior is 
not adequately explained by direct experience, and responses to stimuli generalize broadly based 
on interactions between internal processes (e.g., language, cognition), rather than resulting from 
direct stimulus associations. In this way, an individual derives beliefs and patterns of responding 
(i.e., rule-governed behaviors) from various first-hand experiences that reciprocally interact and 
can be broadly applied, impacting responses to novel situations without direct conditioning. For 
example, intrusive thoughts about becoming ill after using a toilet in a public restroom may 
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internally generalize to other contamination fears and cognitions (e.g., becoming ill after 
touching a sink in a public restroom, door knobs in a building, etc.). Thus, patterns of avoidance 
may generalize in novel contexts (e.g., touching a door knob) without the direct conditioned 
reinforcer of having become ill in that particular situation. This model may be particularly useful 
for enhancing psychological models of OCD given that obsessional fears can be acquired, and 
may generalize, without direct experience or exposure to a stimulus (e.g., fear of having hit a 
pedestrian with a car).
One construct derived from RFT which may additively explain the risk for and 
maintenance of OCD above and beyond obsessive beliefs is cognitive fusion, which refers to the 
tendency to “buy in” to thoughts and feelings and interpret the content of such internal 
experiences literally (Hayes et al., 2006; Herzberg et al., 2012). Although there is conceptual 
overlap between cognitive fusion and obsessional beliefs—particularly obsessive beliefs 
pertaining to the importance of thoughts—the former is defined as a process by which the person 
becomes attached to thoughts or evaluations of a particular event or experience, and views such 
thoughts or evaluations as if they were the same as the actual event or experience to which they 
refer, often without accounting for context (Herzberg et al., 2012). Cognitive fusion can be 
adaptive; for example, it is the process by which one becomes drawn in and engaged with 
storylines within books or movies. Obsessional beliefs, on the other hand, are defined as a set of 
dysfunctional cognitions or cognitive biases, such as the idea that thoughts can influence actions, 
and lead to negative emotional and behavioral responses (Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions 
Working Group, 2005).
Two measures have been developed and evaluated to assess cognitive fusion: the 
Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (CFQ; (Gillanders et al., 2014)) and the Believability of Anxious 
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Feelings and Thoughts Questionnaire (BAFT; (Herzberg et al., 2012)). The BAFT is composed 
of subscales that capture three empirically derived domains of cognitive fusion, including (a) 
negative evaluation, defined as the tendency to believe in negative evaluations of anxiety-related 
thoughts and feelings; (b) emotion regulation, defined as the tendency to struggle with trying to 
control unwanted emotions that are perceived as necessary to dismiss; and (c) somatic concerns, 
defined as the tendency to believe thoughts regarding one’s body and physical sensations. 
Cognitive fusion may contribute to and maintain the misinterpretation of intrusive thoughts 
leading individuals to view such internal experiences as highly believable (i.e., as facts).  
Research provides initial support for an association between cognitive fusion and OCD 
symptoms (Reuman, Buchholz, & Abramowitz, 2018; Reuman, Buchholz, Blakey, & 
Abramowitz, 2017; Reuman, Jacoby, & Abramowitz, 2016), as well as the effectiveness of 
acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT)—which is derived from the principles of RFT—in 
ameliorating the symptoms of OCD by targeting cognitive fusion (Bluett, Homan, Morrison, 
Levin, & Twohig, 2014). Few studies, however, have specifically examined the relevance of 
cognitive fusion to OCD symptom dimensions. In separate nonclinical samples, Reuman, 
Jacoby, and Abramowitz (2016) and Reuman, Buchholz, Blakey, and Abramowitz (2017) found 
that cognitive fusion and experiential avoidance predicted the unacceptable thoughts OC 
symptom dimension beyond combinations of obsessive beliefs. In a clinical sample of 
individuals diagnosed with OCD, however, Reuman, Buchholz, and Abramowitz (2018) found 
that whereas cognitive fusion uniquely predicted unacceptable thoughts, it did not explain 
additional variability over and above obsessive beliefs and general distress. 
A noteworthy limitation of the studies on cognitive fusion and OCD as summarized 
above is that all have relied exclusively on the CFQ, which measures cognitive fusion as a 
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unidimensional construct. Thus, no studies have investigated whether the various domains of 
cognitive fusion incrementally enhance the explanatory power of existing cognitive-behavioral 
models of OCD.   As cognitive fusion is multidimensional, using the BAFT may provide a more 
nuanced understanding of the relation between this construct and OCD symptom dimensions. 
For example, the tendency to buy into anxious thoughts and feelings, but not physical sensations, 
might predict the OCD symptom dimensions of responsibility for causing or preventing harm 
and unacceptable thoughts. Conversely, the tendency to believe anxious thoughts and feelings 
about emotion regulation and somatic concerns might be predict symmetry OCD symptoms, 
which often involve “not just right experiences.” 
Accordingly, the present study aimed to expand upon previous research by examining the 
relevance of specific domains of cognitive fusion to OCD symptom dimensions and their 
potential to augment the explanatory power of obsessive beliefs. On the basis of theory and 
previous empirical work, we first predicted that (a) obsessive beliefs regarding the tendency to 
overestimate threat and responsibility, and (b) the negative evaluation domain of cognitive fusion 
would predict the responsibility for harm OCD symptom dimension. Second, we predicted that 
(a) obsessive beliefs regarding the need for perfection and certainty, and (b) the emotion 
regulation and negative evaluation domains of cognitive fusion would predict the symmetry 
OCD dimension. Third, we predicted that (a) obsessive beliefs about the importance of and need 
to control thoughts, and (b) the negative evaluation and emotion regulation domains of cognitive 
fusion would predict the unacceptable thoughts OCD dimension. Finally, we predicted that for 
the three aforementioned OCD symptom dimensions, the specified cognitive fusion domains 
would add explanatory power to that of obsessive beliefs. We had no a priori predictions 
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regarding contamination OCD symptoms given the lack of relationships found in previous 
research (e.g., Reuman et al., 2018, 2016).
2. Materials and Methods
2.1 Participants
Participants in the present study were 52 treatment-seeking adults with a DSM-5 primary 
diagnosis of OCD who participated in a randomized controlled trial comparing traditional 
exposure and response prevention (ERP) to ERP conducted within an acceptance and 
commitment therapy framework (ACT+ERP). The methods of the parent trial are described in 
detail by Twohig et al. (2018). Initially, 74 individuals were assessed to determine eligibility to 
participate in the parent trial. Sixteen did not meet eligibility criteria and were excluded at the 
initial intake visit (see Twohig et al., 2018 for an explanation for exclusions). Fifty-eight 
individuals with a primary or co-primary diagnosis of OCD were enrolled and randomized to 
treatment. Six participants were further excluded from the present study due to substantial 
missing baseline data on our variables of interest, and thus the present study sample size was 52. 
The sample had a mean age of 27.16 years (SD = 8.48) with a range of 18 to 56 years, and 
included 18 males (34.6%), 33 females (63.5%), and 1 individual missing demographic 
information. In terms of race and ethnicity, within our sample 76.9% of individuals identified as 
Caucasian and Non-Hispanic (n = 40), 5.8% as African American (n = 3), 3.8% as Asian 
American (n = 2), 1.9% as Native American (n = 1), 7.7% as Hispanic (n = 4), and 1.9% as 
another race or ethnicity not specified (n = 1).
Participants were enrolled at two sites: the Anxiety and Stress Disorders Clinic at the 
University of North Carolina (N = 25) and the ACT Research Laboratory at Utah State 
University (N = 27). Eligible participants were not currently using any psychotropic medication 
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or were stabilized in their medication dose for at least one month, not receiving other 
psychotherapy, and did not report previously receiving formal ERP or ACT for OCD. 
Participants were excluded if they had active suicidal ideation, a current severe major depressive 
episode, current mania, psychosis, or borderline or schizotypal personality disorder.
2.2 Procedure
Participants who appeared likely to be eligible were screened by phone and invited to an 
on-site assessment. During this screening visit, all participants provided informed consent. The 
Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview 5.0 (MINI 5.0) was administered by a trained 
evaluator to assess for a current, primary OCD diagnosis as well as any other current or lifetime 
psychiatric disorders. Additional clinician-administered and self-report measures were 
completed, including the measures of interest for the present study (described in more detail 
below). All data included in the present study were obtained at the pre-treatment (baseline) 
assessment visit. The Institutional Review Board at each university approved all study 
procedures, and participants and participant data were treated in accord with the APA Ethics 
Code. 
2.3 Measures
2.3.1 Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 
2005). The OBQ, a 44-item self-report instrument, measures dysfunctional (“obsessive”) beliefs 
thought to contribute to the escalation of normal intrusive thoughts into clinical obsessions. It 
contains three subscales: (a) responsibility and threat overestimation (OBQ-RT), (b) importance 
and control of thoughts (OBQ-ICT), and (c) perfectionism and need for certainty (OBQ-PC). 
Individual items (e.g., “Having bad thoughts means I am weird or abnormal”) are rated from 1 
(“Disagree very much”) to 7 (“Agree very much”). The instrument’s good validity, internal 
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consistency, and test-retest reliability are described in OCCWG (2005). The reliability of the OBQ 
subscales (OBQ-RT α=.93, OBQ-ICT α=.92, OBT-PC α=.92) were excellent in the present study 
sample. 
2.3.2 Dimensional Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (Abramowitz et al., 2010). The DOCS is a 20-
item self-report measure that assesses OCD symptom severity across the four most empirically 
supported symptom dimensions: responsibility for harm, symmetry (i.e., the need for things to be 
“just right”), unacceptable (repugnant) thoughts, and contamination. Within each dimension 
(subscale), five items are rated on a five point Likert scale (0-4) to assess: time occupied by 
obsessions and compulsions, avoidance behaviors, associated distress, functional interference, 
and difficulty disregarding the obsessions and refraining from the compulsions over the past 
month. A sample item reads, “About how much time have you spent each day with unwanted 
unpleasant thoughts and with behavioral or mental actions to deal with them?” 
The DOCS subscales have good to excellent reliability in both clinical and undergraduate 
samples ( = .83 - .96), and test-retest reliability analyses indicate adequate stability of test 
scores. In the present study, the reliability across the DOCS subscales was similarly excellent ( 
= .93 - .96). The measure converges well with other measures of OCD symptoms and 
discriminates from general measures of depression, anxiety, stress, and social anxiety in patients 
and students.
2.3.3 Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988). The BDI-II is a 21-
item self-report scale that assesses the severity of depressive symptoms experienced during the 
past week. Respondents rate items related to depressive symptoms (e.g., sadness, fatigue) on a 
Likert scale ranging from 0 to 3. Total scores range from 0 to 63, and higher scores indicate 
greater depressive symptomatology. The reliability of the BDI in the present study sample was 
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excellent ( = .93). 
2.3.4 Believability of Anxious Thoughts and Feelings (Herzberg et al., 2012). The BAFT is a 
16-item, self-report scale that assess cognitive fusion as it pertains to the believability of 
thoughts and feelings. Respondents rate the believability of each item on a 7-point likert scale 
ranging from “not at all believable” to “completely believable.” Total scores range from 0 to 96, 
with higher score indicative of greater cognitive fusion. The three empirically-derived BAFT 
subscales correspond to three domains of cognitive fusion: negative evaluations (BAFT-NE; e.g., 
“My anxious thoughts and feelings are a problem”), emotion regulation (BAFT-ER; e.g., “I must 
do something about my anxiety and fear when it shows up”), and somatic concerns (BAFT-SC; 
e.g., “My anxious thoughts and feelings are not normal”). The BAFT has demonstrated strong 
psychometric validity in both undergraduate students and anxious community samples (Herzberg 
et al., 2012). Specifically, the BAFT showed excellent internal consistency for the total BAFT 
score and subscale scores (e.g., > .9) in both undergraduate and community samples. Moreover, 
the BAFT and its subscales presented with high convergent validity to measures that assess 
overlapping cognitive constructs (e.g., experiential avoidance, thought suppression, mindfulness) 
as well as other related clinical symptoms (e.g., anxiety symptoms, worry, anxiety sensitivity). 
Factor analytic findings suggested a hierarchical factor structure with three lower order factors 
and one overall hierarchical factor, supporting that cognitive fusion represents a cohesive 
construct that can present in various domain-specific ways, which merit consideration. For 
example, the subscales of the BAFT were differentially associated with clinical correlates and 
outcome measures assessed by Herzberg and colleagues (2012). In the present study sample, the 
reliability of the BAFT total score was good ( = .87), and the reliability of its subscales 
acceptable (BAFT-NE  = .78, BAFT-ER  = .78, BAFT-SC  = .68). 
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2.4 Data Analytic Plan
Our approach to data analysis included the following steps: first, we computed 
descriptive statistics for all study variables. Second, we computed a series of two-tailed zero-
order correlations to examine associations among the BDI-II, OBQ subscales, BAFT subscales, 
and DOCS subscales. Third, to examine the unique and combined contributions of the three 
domains of obsessive beliefs and the three cognitive fusion domains in predicting OCD symptom 
dimensions over and above general distress, we computed four conceptually-informed 
hierarchical regression equations (one for each DOCS subscale). In each regression the BDI-II 
was entered in step 1, the OBQ subscales in step 2, and the BAFT subscales in step 3. 
3. Results
3.1 Group Mean Scores
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis for all measures. 
Scores on the DOCS and OBQ were typical of treatment-seeking individuals with OCD and 
indicated moderate to severe levels of obsessions, compulsions, and obsessive beliefs (Jacoby, 
Fabricant, Leonard, Riemann, & Abramowitz, 2013). The mean BDI-II score indicated moderate 
depressive symptomatology. Scores on the BAFT in this sample were considerably higher than 
those reported in a nonclinical sample, and similar to samples of individuals with anxiety 
disorders (Herzberg et al., 2012). 
3.2 Correlation Analyses
Table 2 presents zero-order bivariate (Pearson) correlation coefficients among all study 
measures. As can be seen, there was a considerable range in the strength of associations between 
variables: rs ranged from 0.00 (OBQ-RT with BDI-II) to 0.69 (OBQ-RT with DOCS 
Responsibility for Harm). We applied a Benjamini-Hochberg procedure to correct for the false 
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discovery rate among the correlations (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). This yielded a corrected 
alpha level of p < .019. 
The table shows that the DOCS subscales were not significantly inter-correlated. The 
OBQ-ICT subscale was significantly and positively correlated with OBQ-RT, but no other OBQ 
subscales were inter-correlated. The BAFT subscales were significantly correlated, yet the 
magnitude of these relationships suggests that they may be treated as meaningfully distinct 
constructs (rs: 0.41-0.55). Finally, the BDI-II was associated with the DOCS unacceptable 
thoughts subscale symptom dimension, both the OBQ-ICT and OBQ-PC subscales, and all three 
BAFT subscales. 
The DOCs subscales were uniquely correlated with different patterns of OBQ and BAFT 
subscales. The DOCS-Responsibility for Harm subscale was strongly associated with the OBQ-
RT.  The DOCS symmetry subscale was associated with OBQ-PC and BAFT-NE. The DOCS-
unacceptable thoughts subscale was positively correlated with the OBQ-ICT as well as the 
BAFT-ER and SC subscales. Finally, the DOCS contamination subscale was not significantly 
associated with any OBQ or BAFT subscales.
3.3 Predictors of OCD Symptom Dimensions
Summary statistics for the full model in each hierarchical regression analysis predicting 
the DOCS subscales appear in Table 3. The data structure met all statistical assumptions 
regarding linear regression models. 
3.3.1 Predicting DOCS-Responsibility for Harm. In Step 1, the BDI-II did not explain 
significant variance in DOCS-responsibility for harm scores (R2 = 0.04, p = 0.18). Addition of 
the OBQ subscales in Step 2, however, did account for significant additional variance (R2 change 
= 0.53, p <0.001). Addition of the BAFT subscales in Step 3 did not explain significant 
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additional variance (R2 change = 0.02, p = 0.54). The final model accounted for 59% of the 
variance in DOCS-responsibility for harm scores, F (7,51) = 8.89, p < 0.001, and only the 
OBQ–RT subscale emerged as a significant unique predictor. 
3.3.2 Predicting DOCS-Symmetry. In Step 1, the BDI-II did not explain significant 
variance in DOCS-symmetry scores (R2 < 0.02, p = 0.31). Addition of the OBQ subscales in Step 
2, however, explained significant additional variance (R2 change = 0.22, p = 0.008). Addition of 
the BAFT subscales in Step 3 also explained significant additional variance (R2 change = 0.20, p 
= 0.003). The final model accounted for 44% of the variance in DOCS-symmetry scores, F(7,51) 
= 4.92, p = .001, and the BDI-II, OBQ–PC, and BAFT-NE emerged as significant unique 
predictors. 
3.3.3 Predicting DOCS-Unacceptable Thoughts. In Step 1, the BDI-II explained 
significant variance (R2 = 0.18, p = .002) in DOCS-unacceptable thoughts scores. Addition of the 
OBQ subscales in Step 2 explained significant additional variance (R2 change = 0.24, p = 0.001); 
yet addition of the BAFT subscales in Step 3 did not (R2 change = .02, p = 0.76). The final model 
accounted for 43% of the variance in DOCS-unacceptable thoughts scores, F(7,51) = 4.81, p < 
0.001 and the OBQ-ICT was the only significant unique predictor.
3.3.4 Predicting DOCS-Contamination. In Step 1, the BDI-II did not explain 
significant variance in DOCS-contamination scores (R2 = 0.03, p = .21).  g the OBQ subscales in 
Step 2 did not explain significant additional variance (R2 change = 0.08, p < .24). Similarly,  g 
the BAFT subscales in Step 3 did not add to the explanatory power of the model (R2 change = 
0.04, p = 0.58). The final model accounted for 15.0% of the variance in DOCS-contamination 
scores, F (7,51) = 1.11, p = .37. 
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4. Discussion
The aim of the present study was to elucidate the relationships among domains of 
cognitive fusion, obsessive beliefs, and OCD symptoms, and to examine their independent and 
relative contributions in the prediction of OCD symptom dimensions. To date, few studies have 
examined cognitive fusion in OCD, and the existing work has used only unifactorial measures of 
this construct. The present study therefore adds to this body of work by examining the extent to 
which different domains of cognitive fusion predict OCD symptoms, and the extent to which 
they add explanatory power to the traditional cognitive-behavioral model.
Our first prediction was partially supported in that, after accounting for general distress, 
the tendency to overestimate threat and responsibility explained significant variance in 
obsessions and compulsions focused on responsibility for harm. The negative evaluation domain 
of cognitive fusion, however, as well as the other cognitive fusion domains, were not 
significantly associated with this OCD symptom dimension. Thus our correlational analyses 
indicate that this presentation of OCD is associated with cognitive distortions, but not the 
tendency to “buy into” intrusive thoughts or doubts. Our regression analyses further suggest that 
overestimates of threat and responsibility are such a robust predictor of OCD symptoms related 
to the fear of causing or not doing enough to prevent harm or mistakes that they leave little 
variance to be explained by cognitive fusion. 
Our second hypothesis was also partially supported. Beliefs pertaining to the need for 
perfection and certainty (in addition to general distress) significantly predicted the symmetry and 
ordering OCD symptom dimension. Also as expected, the emotion regulation and negative 
evaluation domains of cognitive fusion were strongly associated with these types of obsessions 
and compulsions; however, in our regression analysis only the negative evaluation domain 
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additively explained variance in these symptoms above and beyond obsessive beliefs and general 
distress. This study is the first to elucidate an additive role for cognitive fusion in accounting for 
symmetry and ordering OCD symptoms. Moreover, the contribution of cognitive fusion appears 
to be domain-specific: our findings indicate that judging unwanted internal experiences to be 
problematic and as having undesirable consequences contributes to the symmetry OCD 
dimension, even above and beyond obsessive beliefs about the importance of certainty and 
exactness. In line with conceptual models (Summerfeldt, 2004) and previous empirical work 
(Coles, Frost, Heimberg, & Rhéaume, 2003; Coles, Heimberg, Frost, & Steketee, 2005; Smith et 
al., 2012), perhaps cognitive fusion specifically manifests as the intolerability of “not-just-right 
experiences” observed among individuals with symmetry and ordering symptoms. 
Relatedly, it is unclear whether “not just right experiences” are fundamentally sensory or 
affective phenomena, or the extent to which they have a cognitive (dysfunctional belief) 
component (Taylor et al., 2006). Our finding that the tendency to negatively judge unwanted 
internal experiences better explains symmetry OCD symptoms relative to beliefs about the need 
for perfection and certainty indicates a shortcoming in current obsessive belief models of this 
type of OCD symptom and represents an area for future research. It also highlights the 
heterogeneity of OCD symptoms and the importance of a dimensional approach to understanding 
the phenomenology and etiology of this disorder. 
Our third hypothesis that the tendency to overestimate the importance and need to control 
intrusive thoughts would predict the unacceptable thoughts OCD symptom dimension was 
supported as well, replicating previous research (Reuman et al., 2018, 2017, 2016). Although the 
negative evaluation and emotion regulation domains of cognitive fusion were strongly associated 
with the unacceptable thoughts OCD symptom dimension, they failed to add to the predictive 
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power of the cognitive-behavioral model accounting for obsessive beliefs and general distress. 
Of note, previous research has implicated a role for cognitive fusion in unacceptable thoughts 
symptoms (Reuman et al., 2018). One explanation for this discrepant finding in our sample is the 
conceptual overlap between the emotion regulation domain of cognitive fusion and the 
importance and control of thoughts domain of obsessive beliefs. Both constructs integrate the 
need to regulate internal experiences; yet whereas the OBQ-ICT specifically assesses this 
phenomenon as it relates to intrusive thoughts, the BAFT-ER assesses the need to control 
anxious affect and physiological sensations (Herzberg et al., 2012; Obsessive Compulsive 
Cognitions Working Group, 2005). The strong association between these two measures indicates 
that both constructs tap into psychological inflexibility regarding the acceptability of private, 
distressing experiences. Conceptually, our results suggest that psychological inflexibility in this 
regard may be particularly relevant to symmetry and ordering OCD symptoms. Statistically, 
however, this leaves little room for the emotion regulation domain of cognitive fusion to add 
explanatory power of the cognitive-behavioral model in addition to obsessive beliefs.
Neither obsessive beliefs nor cognitive fusion predicted contamination symptoms, which 
was unsurprising given that previous findings have been mixed regarding the utility of these 
constructs in explaining contamination obsessions and washing/cleaning rituals (Reuman et al., 
2018; Viar, Bilsky, Armstrong, & Olatunji, 2011; Wheaton et al., 2010). To this effect, 
obsessions and compulsions regarding contamination primarily focus on external situations and 
stimuli (Rachman, 2004), rather than unwanted private experiences such as responsibility, guilt, 
unacceptable thoughts and feelings, and not just right experiences that characterize other 
presentations of OCD. As such, beliefs and thoughts regarding internal experiences may play 
less of a role in contamination concerns relative to other OCD symptom dimensions. 
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A notable exception to this distinction worthy of consideration is “mental contamination” 
(Coughtrey, Shafran, Knibbs, & Rachman, 2012; Radomsky, Rachman, Shafran, Coughtrey, & 
Barber, 2014). This manifestation of contamination symptoms presents as feelings of “moral 
dirtiness” in the absence of contact with an external contaminant. Although we did not 
specifically assess moral contamination in the present study, it may be informative for future 
research to examine whether cognitive fusion plays a differential role in the prediction of this 
form of contamination symptoms, given their internalized nature. This further raises the 
possibility that the heterogeneity of contamination concerns in OCD limits the explanatory 
power of constructs such as obsessive beliefs and cognitive fusion. Indeed, contamination 
obsessions in OCD can present as a fear of illness, concerns about germs per se (i.e., without the 
fear of illness), disgust, and moral contamination. Thus future research should also address 
conceptual models among these manifestations of contamination fears.
Our findings have implications for future research and for the treatment of OCD. This 
study provides additional support for the utility of considering symptom dimensions when 
examining factors that contribute to the maintenance of OCD. Our findings serve as a replication 
and extension of existing work examining the relevance of cognitive fusion and overlapping 
cognitive constructs (e.g., thought-action fusion, obsessive beliefs) with a novel measure that 
facilitates a more dimensional, domain-specific assessment of cognitive fusion. To this effect, 
future research will be beneficial for understanding this condition to the extent that it focuses on 
symptom dimensions as opposed to treating OCD as a homogeneous condition. Such a 
dimensional understanding is also necessary to inform more precise, idiographic targets for 
treatment and contribute to the development of more effective, tailored treatment approaches. 
Despite empirically supported psychological interventions for OCD, our knowledge of what 
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factors predict which treatments will work best for whom is still limited. Findings, such as those 
provided by the present study, and future work along these lines, may refine our ability to 
optimally tailor and match individuals to evidence-based therapeutic techniques. For example, 
defusion strategies employed in ACT may be utilized to augment the effectiveness of exposure 
and response prevention for treating obsessions and compulsions related to symmetry and 
ordering. This approach may maximize gains by concurrently challenging core beliefs and 
targeting cognitive processes (e.g., cognitive fusion) contributing to the maintenance of 
symptoms. On the other hand, OCD symptoms related to harm may be most efficiently targeted 
through exposure and cognitive restructuring techniques that challenge core beliefs around 
responsibility and threat.  
It is also important to consider a number of limitations of the present study. Notably, our 
data are cross-sectional and thus do not permit causal conclusions. To address this limitation, 
prospective studies may build upon this work to clarify the temporal and directional nature of our 
findings. Our results align with cognitive-behavioral and psychological flexibility 
conceptualizations of OCD, supporting that implicated constructs (e.g., beliefs, cognitive fusion) 
lead to the development and maintenance of obsessions and compulsions. However, it is 
important to note that symptoms of OCD could lead to obsessive beliefs and cognitive fusion, or 
that variables not assessed in the present study contribute to or explain the effects observed in the 
present study. Participants in the present study were formally diagnosed with primary (or co-
primary) OCD through a clinical interview; however, secondary analyses were not adequately 
powered to examine the impact of comorbid diagnoses on our findings. To address this 
limitation, we controlled for general distress (with the BDI-II) in all analyses. Although we used 
this control for general distress, we were not able to include a control group in the present study, 
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and therefore it is possible that our findings are not specific to OCD. Indeed, given that 
psychological flexibility has been implicated transdiagnostically across anxiety disorders and 
commonly comorbid psychological conditions (e.g., depression, eating disorders, substance use; 
(Bardeen & Fergus, 2016; Steven C. Hayes & Pankey, 2002; Luoma, Kohlenberg, Hayes, & 
Fletcher, 2012), an important next step may be to examine the implications and relevance of 
these findings to the maintenance and treatment of complex, comorbid presentations of OCD. 
An additional limitation is that our results relied exclusively on self-report instruments. 
Such method invariance can inflate associations among constructs. However, limited validated 
and objective paradigms exist to assess obsessive beliefs and cognitive fusion outside of self-
report measures. The promise of empirically-derived, behavioral paradigms for informing our 
conceptualization and treatment of OCD has been evidenced in existing work in this area 
regarding intolerance of uncertainty (Jacoby, Abramowitz, Reuman, & Blakey, 2016) and 
thought-action fusion (Berman, Abramowitz, Wheaton, Pardue, & Fabricant, 2011). The 
development and validation of ecologically valid, multi-method assessment approaches for 
constructs relevant to psychological flexibility and implicated in OCD symptom dimensions 
would be a substantial contribution to this line of work and would facilitate important future 
research to explain the onset and maintenance of OCD. Finally, while the present study valuably 
examined these relationships in a clinical population, our sample was relatively small (N = 52) 
and consistent of treatment-seeking outpatients with primary OCD. As such, our results may be 
limited in generalizability, and future work in this area is needed to investigate the relevance of 
our findings in larger, diverse samples and settings of individuals with OCD (e.g., inpatient). 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for study measures
Measure Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis
DOCS- Harm/Responsibility 8.30 5.56 -0.06 -1.19
DOCS- Symmetry 6.85 5.17 0.18 -1.04
DOCS- Unacceptable Thoughts 9.33 4.99 -0.41 -0.79
DOCS- Contamination 7.89 6.35 0.06 -1.51
BDI-II 15.74 9.86 0.34 -0.74
OBQ – PC 78.62 20.56 -0.73 0.23
OBQ – RT 72.45 22.79 -0.13 -0.65
OBQ - ICT 47.44 17.12 0.45 -0.82
BAFT – NE 34.24 5.69 -0.98 1.29
BAFT – ER 28.89 4.76 -0.59 -0.42
BAFT – SC 19.30 6.29 0.28 -0.60
Note. DOCS = Dimensional Obsessive Compulsive Scale; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; 
OBQ = Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire; ICT = Importance of Controlling Thoughts; RT = 
Responsibility/Threat; PC = Perfectionism/Certainty; BAFT = Believability of Feelings and 
Thoughts, NE = Negative Evaulation, ER = Emotion Regulation, SC = Somatic Concerns
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Table 2. Zero-order bivariate (Pearson) correlations. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. DOCS- Responsibility 
for Harm --
2. DOCS- Symmetry .13 --
3. DOCS- Unacceptable 
Thoughts -.01 .11 --
4. DOCS- Contamination .18 .14 -.08 --
5. BDI-II  .19 .14 .42* .18 --
6. OBQ – ICT .00 -.01  .60* -.05 .34* --
7. OBQ – RT  .69*  .17  .16  .16 .01  .36* --
8. OBQ - PC -.20  .47*  .25  .01 .42*  .27  .31 --
9. BAFT – NE  .12  .49*  .29  .28 .62*  .28  .32  .47* --
10. BAFT – ER -.12  .33* .39*  .12 .42*  .60*  .18  .32  .55* --
11. BAFT – SC  .34* .29 .39* .15 .38*  .45* .55*  .32  .59*  .42* --
*Benjamini-Hochberg corrected alpha: p < 0.019.
Note. DOCS = Dimensional Obsessive Compulsive Scale; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; 
OBQ = Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire; ICT = Importance of Controlling Thoughts; RT = 
Responsibility/Threat; PC = Perfectionism/Certainty; BAFT = Believability of Feelings and 
Thoughts, NE = Negative Evaluation, ER = Emotion Regulation, SC = Somatic Concerns
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Table 3. Summary statistics for BDI-II, OBQ Subscales, and BAFT Subscales predicting DOCS 
subscales.
Variable R2 Beta t p
Predicting DOCS-Responsibility for Harm 
Full Model 0.59 <0.001
BDI-II -.17 -1.24 n.s.
OBQ – ICT -0.18 -1.33 n.s.
OBQ – RT 0.67 5.07 <0.001
OBQ – PC 0.11 0.93 n.s.
BAFT – NE 0.03 0.19 n.s.
BAFT – ER -0.17 -1.18 n.s.
BAFT - SC 0.13 0.91 n.s.
Predicting DOCS-Symmetry
Full Model 0.44 <0.001
BDI-II -0.35 -2.12 <0.05
OBQ - ICT -0.26 -1.58 n.s.
OBQ - RT -0.10 -0.66 n.s.
OBQ – PC 0.40 2.95 <0.05
BAFT – NE 0.43 2.26 <0.05
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BAFT – ER 0.23 1.39 n.s.
BAFT - SC 0.11 0.68 n.s.
Predicting DOCS- Unacceptable Thoughts
Full Model 0.43 <0.001
BDI-II 0.22 1.32 n.s.
OBQ - ICT .53 3.25 <0.001
OBQ - RT -0.12 -0.76 n.s.
OBQ – PC 0.04 0.31 n.s.
BAFT – NE -0.06 -0.29 n.s.
BAFT – ER -0.05 -0.31 n.s.
BAFT - SC 0.18 1.05 n.s.
Predicting DOCS-Contamination
Full Model 0.15 0.37
BDI-II 0.20 0.99 n.s.
OBQ - ICT -0.27 -1.37 n.s.
OBQ - RT 0.27 1.44 n.s.
OBQ – PC -0.20 -1.21 n.s.
BAFT – NE 0.19 0.82 n.s.
BAFT – ER 0.14 0.67 n.s.
OBSESSIVE BELIEFS AND COGNITIVE FUSION IN OCD   32
BAFT - SC -0.07 -0.32 n.s.
Note. DOCS = Dimensional Obsessive Compulsive Scale; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-
II; OBQ = Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire; ICT = Importance of Controlling Thoughts; RT = 
Responsibility/Threat; PC = Perfectionism/Certainty; BAFT = Believability of Feelings and 
Thoughts, NE = Negative Evaluation, ER = Emotion Regulation, SC = Somatic Concerns
